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Intimidation of Defense Witnesses
at the International Criminal Tribunals:
Commentary and Suggested Legal Remedies
Jared Paul Marx*
Aloys Simba, a defendant at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR"), has claimed that Rwandan prison guards threatened
witnesses who could exculpate him. As a result, he says, the frightened witnesses
decided not to testify, thus denying him a complete defense.' Th~oneste
Bagosora, also on trial at the ICTR, has made similar claims. 2 In both cases, the

tribunal ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove the allegation and
never reached the legal merits of the claims.' The issue is likely to arise again,
and since it is novel to both the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), it deserves attention.
This Comment begins with a short discussion of the legal status and the
goals of the tribunals in section I. Section II examines the question of whether
intimidation of defense witnesses is a due process violation under international
criminal law. The tribunals' statutes and case law do not explicitly state whether
witness intimidation is a violation of due process rights, but a plain-meaning
reading of the statute, supported by evidence of customary international law,
suggests that it is.
Section III compares the remedies the tribunals grant for due process
violations caused by tribunal actors with the remedies granted for due process
violations caused by United Nations ("UN") member states. The case law
reveals that the tribunals have a significant tendency to grant greater remedies

I
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Prosecutor v Simba, Case No ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment and Sentence,
41 (Dec 13, 2005)
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(hereinafter Simba, Judgment).
Prosecutorv Bagosora, Case No ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Motion Concerning Alleged Witness
Intimidation, 9 1-2 (Dec 28, 2004) (hereinafter Bagosora, Decision).
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when tribunal officials are responsible for the violations, which is a worrisome
trend. I suggest that if the tribunals wash their hands of state actions and make it
more difficult for defendants to prove their innocence, substantive justice will
suffer and the tribunals' effectiveness will be eroded. To support this claim, I
look at what US courts have done when defense witnesses are intimidated by
third-party government actors. There are, of course, myriad differences between
the tribunals and US courts, but the comparison is useful within strict
boundaries. I suggest that the tribunals ought to grant a remedy that is identical
to the remedy they would grant were they responsible for the process violations
themselves.
Finally, in section IV, I argue that if an intimidated witness's absence could
have affected the outcome of the trial, then a suspended trial or retrial is the
appropriate remedy. If the witness remains unavailable, however, then the
appropriate remedy is a dismissal of the case. To support this position, I argue
first that there are normative grounds for excluding the possibility of conviction
if a defendant has been deprived of the ability to present an exculpating witness.
Any lesser remedy would admit the possibility that a conviction might be
secured through illegal action of an interested state. Second, I argue that this
remedy provides the most reliable method for assuring future cooperation from
the states on which the tribunal depends. Because interfering states are likely to
be interested in convictions, they will have an incentive to avoid interfering with
defense witnesses if there is a possibility that interference could lead to an
acquittal. Still, this remedy may appear severe, so I address some serious
challenges to it before concluding in section V.4
I. THE LEGAL STATUS AND GOALS OF THE TRIBUNALS
Both the ICTR and the ICTY were established through resolutions passed
by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN Charter.
The resolutions adopt statutes defining the crimes to be prosecuted as well as
procedural rules for prosecution.5 The statutes also establish the geographic and
temporal jurisdiction for the tribunals, the rights of defendants, and the
responsibilities of UN member states to the tribunals.6 Specifically, both statutes
4

Throughout this Comment, I discuss the experience in both the ICTR and the ICTY, although
there is an admitted emphasis on the ICTR. Even so, references to "tribunals" are to both the
ICTR and the ICTY.

5

Security Council Res No 955, UN Doc S/RES/955, arts 1-4, 14 (1994) (hereinafter ICTR
Resolution & Statute); Security Council Res No 827, UN Doc S/RES/827,
2-3 (1993)
(adopting statute proposed in United Nations, Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of
Securiy Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc S/25704 (1993) (hereinafter ICTY Report)).
ICTR Resolution & Statute at arts 7, 20, 28 (cited in note 5); ICTY Report
60-63, 106-07,
125-27 (cited in note 5).
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require that UN member states "shall cooperate with the [tribunals] in the
investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious
violations of international humanitarian law."'
These resolutions bind all UN member states. And by reference to Chapter
VII, the Security Council has the right to take measures up to and including the
use of force to compel compliance with the resolutions.8 In spite of this power,
the UN has never used force-or even a lesser penalty of sanctions-to compel
a UN member state to cooperate with the tribunals. In view of the tribunals'
limited scope and the high political cost of using coercion to force compliance, it
is unlikely that the Security Council will ever employ these measures.
Because neither the UN nor the tribunals have standing police forces, they
regularly rely on the goodwill of member states to apprehend suspects and
temporarily detain them. At the ICTR, where virtually all relevant evidence and
witnesses are in Rwanda, the tribunal relies particularly on the cooperation of the
Rwandan government to allow investigators access to the country and to deliver
witnesses for trial. The ICTY likewise relies upon cooperation from all of the
states of the former Yugoslavia.
Because of this ambiguous posture, the political relationship between the
tribunals and the states in which they have jurisdiction can be rocky. Rwanda
originally requested the Security Council to establish the ICTR,9 but ultimately
cast the sole dissenting vote against the ICTR resolution. Rwanda was concerned
primarily with the failure to impose the death penalty, but was also concerned
about the lack of Rwandan judges in the proposed ICTR and the establishment
of the tribunal outside Rwanda.' ° Today, the ICTR shares concurrent but
preemptory jurisdiction with Rwandan national courts, which has caused
friction." While Rwanda has generally cooperated with the ICTR, its moments
of non-cooperation will figure prominently into the analysis in this Comment.
The ICTY's relationship with the states it has jurisdiction over is slightly
different from the ICTR's relationship with Rwanda. By the time the ICTY was
established, the Balkan conflict had fractured power and sovereignty throughout
the region, and there were allegations of human rights violations on all sides. To
many, it appeared that war criminals involved in the conflict would never be

7

ICTR Resolution & Statute at art 28 (cited in note 5); ICTY Report at art 29 (cited in note 5).

8

United Nations Charter, arts 39-42.

9

United Nations, Letter Dated 28 September 1994from the Permanent Representativeof Rwanda to the United
NationsAddressed to the Presidentof the Secunry Counil,UN Doc S/1994/1115 at 4 (1994).
Melissa Gordon, Justice on Tia" 7 he Eficagy of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 1 ILSA J
Intl & Comp L 217, 221-22 (1995).

10
11

Id at 228 (cited in note 10).
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prosecuted fairly in any domestic setting.12 In response, the UN established the
ICTY, which has limited jurisdiction over war criminals in the region. 3 Notably,
the ICTY was imposed on the states in the region by a concerned Security
Council, in contrast to the ICTR. Similar to Rwanda's general (though not
the states of the former
unconditional) cooperation with the ICTR, however,
14
ICTY.
the
with
cooperate
Yugoslavia generally
The tribunals also have goals that reach beyond simple punishment of war
criminals. The resolutions establishing the tribunals state that the situations in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia "constitute[] threat[s] to international peace
and security" and that the tribunals are established to end crimes created by the
conflicts. 5 Similarly, the Rwandan government initially requested the
establishment of an international tribunal primarily to make the country safe for
the return of refugees. 6 Consistent with this, the world at large has an additional
interest in prosecuting war criminals as a means of eliminating the "culture of
impunity" that human rights violators are often said to enjoy. Prosecuting war
criminals in the present, it is reasoned, will deter potential violators who might
otherwise think they can escape punishment.
A related goal of the tribunals is to try international war criminals without
the stain of victors' justice.' The ICTR, for example, was created without a role
for Rwandan judges in order to distance itself from Rwandan influence. 8 The
ICTY, too, was created as a forum to try criminals on all sides of the Balkan
conflict in a single, impartial court.
The elimination of the stain of victors' justice serves several purposes.
First, it performs the normative function of establishing the rule of law in the
wake of human rights violations. An impartial tribunal assures that war crimes
are met with justice rather than revenge. Second, it assures that war criminals on
all sides of a conflict will be prosecuted. This presumably further eliminates the

12

13

Elizabeth L. Pearl, Punishing Balkan Far Criminals: Could the End of Yugoslavia Provide an End to
Victors'Justice?,30 Am Crim L Rev 1373, 1405--06 (1993).
Security Council Res No 808, UN Doc S/RES/808 at 2 (1993).

15

Week/y Press Briefing (May 16, 2001), available online at <http://www.un.org/icty/
briefing/PB 160501.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007); Human Rights Watch, Open Letter to EU. Foreign
Ministers (Feb 7, 2001), available online at <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2001/02/07/
eca2962.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
UN Doc S/RES/808 at 2 (cited in note 13); ICTR Resolution & Statute at 1 (cited in note 5).

16

UN Doc S/1994/1115 at 3-4 (cited in note 9).

17

See generally, Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugoslaia: The
Casefor an InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal,22 Deny J Intl L & Poly 235, 256 (1994); Pearl, 30 Am
Crim L Rev at 1399 (cited in note 12).
See Catherine Toups, Atrodto Probes Home in on Serb, U.N. Requests Casefor War-Crimes Trial,Wash

14

18

See ICI

Times All (Nov 8, 1994), cited in Gordon, 1 ILSAJ Intl & Comp L at 218 (cited in note 10).
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"culture of impunity" and deters war criminals among the victors as well as the
vanquished. Finally, eliminating the stain of victors' justice creates the
impression that the world, not a particular state, is trying the war criminals.
Promoters of global human rights norms will be especially concerned with
conveying the message that the world is punishing war criminals.
States' individual interests also play an important role in shaping the goals
of the tribunals. Without state support, after all, the international criminal
tribunals would not exist. Many states support the goals of the tribunals, but
dislike how costly and slow the tribunals are. As a result, there is also a force that
pushes the tribunals to reduce the process afforded the accused.
Success of the tribunals will largely be measured by the degree to which
these goals are fulfilled. If the tribunals cannot timely and efficiently convict
international war criminals whose crimes are widely known, then they will not be
seen as successful. Likewise, though, if convictions of criminals are seen as
dictated by interested member states or as the result of faulty process, then the
tribunals are also likely to be viewed as ineffective.
II. INTIMIDATION OF DEFENSE WITNESSES AS A DUE
PROCESS VIOLATION
Government intimidation of defense witnesses ought to be viewed as a due
process violation, and the language of the statutes supports this. The statute of
the ICTR provides: "In the determination of any charge against the accused
pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to... obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him or her."' 9 The ICTY statute uses similar
language.2 ° When a state actor interferes with a defendant's witness, the actor
violates the defendant's due process rights by worsening the conditions under
which the defendant can obtain a witness' attendance. To be sure, the ICTR
21
provides identical security protections for defense and prosecution witnesses.
Additionally, though, the tribunal can-and frequently does-detain the accused
before trial to prevent him or her from tampering with prosecution witnesses.
Since the tribunals provide this procedural protection for prosecution witnesses,
a similar procedural protection is due for defense witnesses as well.

19

ICTR Resolution & Statute at art 20 (cited in note 5).

20

ICTY Report at art 21 (e) (cited in note 5).

21

Bagosora, Decision

22

See, for example, Prosecutor v Ndayambaje, Case No ICTR 98-42-T, Decision on the Defence

11.

Motion for the Provisional Release of the Accused,
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Of course, the statute does not make it clear that this right is a due process
right. Nonetheless, the ICTR has done as much in dicta. For example, in the
Bagosora decision, the trial chamber stated that "[n]on-cooperation, or active
obstruction, could adversely affect the fairness of a trial. Threats or intimidation
of confirmed or prospective witnesses by state officials would, if proven, be a
serious violation of the duty of cooperation."2 3 The same chamber, sitting for
the Simba case, paraphrased this dicta, stating that "proven threats or
interference made by state officials towards prospective or confirmed
24
witnesses ...could result in a violation of an accused's fair trial rights.
The view that defense witness intimidation can be a due process violation
is supported by domestic law sources, and the tribunals commonly look to such
law as evidence of international customary law.25 A good example is US law,
which shares significant similarities with the due process rights enshrined in the
tribunals' statutes.
In comparing US law with ICTR and ICTY law, it is first necessary to
establish statutory similarities. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US
Constitution provide criminal defendants with the right to "compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor," and require that "[no] state [shall] deprive
' 26
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Significantly, the ICTR and ICTY language is taken almost verbatim (except for
the gender inclusive language) from the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR").27
If anything, the right to present witnesses on behalf of defendants is more
clearly stated in the tribunal statutes than in the US Constitution. Much, too, can
be made of the fact that the statutory language comes directly from the ICCPR.
First, the ICCPR language is often regarded as a more stringent protector of
defendants' rights than the US Constitution. 28 Additionally, by using the ICCPR
23

Bagosora, Decision

24

Simba, Judgment

7.

25

See, for example, Prosecutor v Seman.a, Case No ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence,

26

(May 15, 2003).
US Const, amends VI, XIV.

27

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UN Treaty Set 171, 177 art 14.3(e)

46.
393

(1966) ("(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;").
28 Diane P. Wood, Our 18th Century Constitution in the 21st Century World, 80 NYU L Rev 1079, 109598 (2005); Ved P. Nanda, InternationalLaw and the Implementation of the American Bar Association
Resolution Regarding the Death Penaly, 4 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 573, 576-79 (1998). See also Jeremy
A. Rabkin, Recalling the Case for Sovereigny, 5 Chi J Intl L 435, 447 (2005). The single notable
exception to this isthe fact that neither the ICCPR nor the tribunal statutes protect the right to a
jury trial.
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language, the UN drafters appear to incorporate into the statute the fairly robust
ICCPR jurisprudence on defendants' rights to present evidence in their favor.29
At any rate, US law strongly supports granting full remedies when
defendants' witnesses are intimidated. The landmark US case on defense witness
intimidation is the Supreme Court's decision in Webb v Texas.30 In Webb, the
judge at trial gave the sole defense witness a "gratuitous[ ]" and "lengthy"
admonition on the "dangers of perjury." 3 Hearing this, the witness chose not to
testify on the defendant's behalf.32 On appeal, the Court granted a retrial. This
precedent has been applied by lower courts in cases involving intimidating
remarks from other government actors as well, including prosecuting attorneys
and federal police agents.33 This is further discussed in the next section.
III. GRANTING REMEDIES FOR THIRD-PARTY DUE
PROCESS VIOLATIONS
The more difficult question in granting remedies is whether and how the
tribunals should take into account the fact that a third-party state, and not the
tribunal, caused the violation of rights.
A. TRIBUNAL CASE LAW
The clearest indication of the tribunals' general attitude toward third-party
state violations comes from two high-profile ICTR Appeals Chamber decisions
34
in
in Prosecutor v BarayagwiZa. The Barayagwia Appeals Chamber decision
November 3, 1999 ("Barayagwiza 1), ordered the release of the defendant based

29

See, for example, Destrehem v France, Eur Ct HR, No 56651/00 (2004) ("The applicant had thus
been found guilty on the basis of testimony in relation to which his defence rights had been
considerably restricted, and this was compounded by the fact that the Court of Appeal itself had
described the penalty it imposed as 'severe.' The Court accordingly considered that Mr Destrehem
had not had a fair trial and held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and
3 (d) [of the European Convention on Human Rights]." Summary available online at
<http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2004/may/chambejudgments180504.htm>
for English
summary (visited Jan 15, 2007).

31

409 US 95 (1972). Webb was based on Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 22-23 (1967), in which the
Court held that a law that prevented a defendant's accomplice from testifying on his behalf
violated the defendant's due process rights. Wasbington effectively incorporated the Sixth
Amendment protections into the Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.
Id at 97.

32

Id at 96.

33

See United States v Foster, 128 F3d 949, 953 (6th Cir 1997); United States v Hammond, 598 F2d 1008,
1013 (5th Cir 1979); United States v Thomas, 488 F2d 334, 335-36 (6th Cir 1973).

34

Prosecutor v Barayagwia, Case No ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Nov 3, 1999) (hereinafter
BarayagwiZa, Decision).

30
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on three separate periods of illegal detention. First was a period from April 17,
1996 to March 10, 1997, when Barayagwiza was held in Cameroon without
being informed of the charges against him. Of this, the Chamber wrote:
[We acknowledge that only 35 days out of the 11-month total are clearly
attributable to the Tribunal .... [But] [a]t this juncture, it is irrelevant that
only a small portion of that total period of provisional detention is
attributable to the Tribunal, since it is the Tribunal-and not any other
35
entity-that is currently adjudicating the Appellant's claims.
The next period was a seven month delay between the prosecutor's Rule 40bis
transfer request on March 4, 1997, and Barayagwiza's arrival in Arusha on
November 19, 1997.36 The Chamber held that because Barayagwiza was not
indicted until October 22, 1997, his entire detention in Cameroon was illegal
because it violated the ninety-day Rule 40bis(H) time limit for charging a
suspect.3 7 The Chamber attributed this delay to the prosecutor's negligence. The
third period was a three-month delay between Barayagwiza's arrival in Arusha
and his first appearance in court on February 23, 1998. The Chamber ruled that
this violated his right to be charged without delay upon arrival at the Tribunal,
and attributed this failing to the Trial Chamber.3 8 In light of these three
violations, the Chamber determined that the only appropriate remedy was
Barayagwiza's immediate release.3 9 Only an emergency motion filed by the
prosecutor kept Barayagwiza in custody.
Five months later, in its March 31, 2000, decision ("BarayagwiZa IT'), the
Appeals Chamber reviewed Baryagwiza I in light of "new facts" and in the face
of Rwandan non-cooperation in response to Barayagwiza's release.4 ° In truth,
the reason for the review was the overwhelmingly negative public response over
Barayagwiza's release. Indeed, the "new facts" were almost certainly available at
the time of the first decision and were likely identified only in order to

35
36

Id

85.
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2005). Rule 40bis(A) provides that "the Prosecutor may
transmit to the Registrar, for an order by a Judge assigned pursuant to Rule 28, a request for the
transfer to and provisional detention of a suspect in the premises of the detention unit of the
Tribunal." Before the filing of the Rule 40bis request, Barayagwiza was detained pursuant to a
Rule 40 request on February 21, 1997.

37

BarayagwiZa, Decision

38

Id

39

Id 1113.

40

Prosecutor v BarayagwiZa, Case No ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor's Request for Review
or Reconsideration),
34, 71 (Mar 31, 2000) (hereinafter Barayagwia, Prosecutor's Request).

67.

68-70.
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circumvent Rule
24, which allows reconsideration of a decision only if new facts
41
light.
to
come
The Chamber began its consideration of the motion by "confirming its
42
Decision of 3 November 1999 on the basis of the facts it was founded on."
The Chamber then proceeded to determine that Barayagwiza had in fact only
been held in Cameroon for eighteen days without knowledge of the charges
against him. 43 Likewise, by reviewing the record of correspondence between
defense counsel and the Trial Chamber, the Chamber determined that there was
only a twenty day delay between when Barayagwiza agreed to have his first
appearance in court and when he was formally indicted. 44 Most significantly, the
Chamber found that the seven month delay between the Rule 40bis request and
Barayagwiza's transfer to Arusha still violated Barayagwiza's rights,
but was
45
attributable to Cameroonian politics, not prosecutorial negligence.
Based on these findings, the Appeals Chamber determined that although
Barayagwiza's due process rights had been violated, the appropriate remedy was
not release but rather a sentence reduction or financial compensation. 46
Barayagwiza II did not overturn the legal rulings in Barayagwiza I,but the
Chamber's emphasis on Cameroon's responsibility for the longest period of
illegal detention suggests that it will adjust a defendant's remedy for a process
violation based on whether the tribunal is at fault.
Two more decisions from the ICTR and one from the ICTY add nuances
to the tribunals' position. Because it is based on nearly identical facts, the May
31, 2000 Semanza Appeals Chamber decision closely mirrors the Baraagwiza II
decision. Semanza was initially arrested in Cameroon at the same time as
Barayagwiza, and was likewise uninformed of the charges against him for
eighteen days. 47 Also, as in Barayagwiza, the prosecutor filed a Rule 40bis request
for Semanza's transfer on March 6, 1997, but did not indict him until October
23, 1997. Semanza was transferred to UN custody on November 19, 1997. 48

42

See, generally, William A. Schabas, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (Decision, and Decision (Prosecutor's
Request for Review or Reconsideration)), 94 Am J Intl L 563 (2000); ICTR Resolution & Statute at art
24 (cited in note 5).
BarqygagviZa, Prosecutor's Request 51.

43

Id T 54.

44

Id T 62.

45

Id

58.

46

Id

75.

47

Prosecutorv SeranZa, Case No ICTR-97-23-A, Decision,
Decision).
Id 77 9, 106.

41

48
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Aside from the fact that Semanza did not face a delay upon arrival in
Arusha, the SemanZa decision differed from Barayagwza II only in the approach
the Chamber took toward the seven-month period between the Prosecutor's
Rule 40bis request and Semanza's arrival in Arusha. Barayagwiza I held that Rule
40bis(H) requires that a suspect be released if not indicted within ninety days of
the filing of a Rule 40bis request, and Barayagwiza II did not overrule this
finding. 49 Thus, while the BarayagwiZa II Chamber emphasized that the delay
between the Rule 40bis request and the indictment was Cameroon's fault, there
was still a nominal violation of Barayagwiza's rights.5"
In Semanza, however, the Chamber reinterpreted Rule 40bis(H) to require
that a suspect be charged ninety days from the date of actual transfer to the
Tribunal's Detention Facility."' Since Semanza's indictment was confirmed
before his transfer, the Chamber held that his rights were not violated. The
Chamber added: "Moreover, the Appeals Chamber emphasizes that in any
event, the Tribunal is not responsible for the time that elapsed before the
Appellant was transferred to the Tribunal's Detention Facility." 2 So while
Semanza was given a sentence reduction for the eighteen days he was in custody
without knowing the charges against him, he was not
given any remedy for the
53
indictment.
his
before
Cameroon
in
spent
months he
Considered in broad context, SemanZa supports the suggestion that the
tribunals take little responsibility for procedural failings outside their control.
The SemanZa decision overturned an Appeals Chamber decision that was barely
six months old, and showed that the ICTR was willing to go to significant
lengths to insulate itself from failures of process caused by independent states.
At a more technical level, however, SemanZa did not overturn the
Barayagwiza holdings suggesting that the tribunals ought to provide remedy for
due process violations outside the tribunals' control. While it may be suspect
that the Appeals Chamber reinterpreted its rules to show that there was no
violation based on a fact pattern where a violation had been found before, it is
significant that the legal argument for remedy remains intact.
This interpretation is buttressed by the recent Kajeljeli Appeals Chamber
judgment, which suggests that the ICTR is perhaps moving again toward taking
responsibility for failures of process that are only partially the fault of ICTR
officials. Kajelijeli was arrested in Benin at the request of the prosecution but

49

Barayagwuza, Decision

50

BaraagwiZa, Prosecutor's Request

67.

51

SemanZa, Decision

52

Id

53

Id.

58.

97.

101.
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was not promptly informed of the charges against him. 4 The Trial Chamber
agreed with the prosecution that no remedy was available for this since the
responsibility to inform the suspect of the charges against him lay with Benin.5"
The Appeals Chamber overturned this decision, charging the ICTR with
ensuring that a suspect is promptly informed of the charges against him
regardless of who carries out the arrest. The Chamber provided a sentence
reduction as remedy. 6
The most significant contribution the ICTY has made to the case law
comes from a decision in Prosecutor v Nikoli.17 Nikoli6 had been kidnapped by
"some unknown individuals" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and turned
over to the UN force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which rendered him into the
custody of the tribunal. s8 Nikoli argued that the ICTY should decline to
exercise jurisdiction over him based on, inter alia, the fact that the kidnapping
was a violation of his process rights.5 9 The Chamber stated that it agreed with
the relevant holdings in Barayagwiza,but also that:
The correct balance must.., be maintained between the fundamental rights
of the accused and the essential interests of the international community in
the prosecution of persons charged with serious violations of international
humanitarian law... [and here] the treatment of the Appellant was not of
6
such an egregious nature as to impede the exercise of jurisdiction. 0
The ICTY appears to affirm the holdings in ICTR cases and crystallize the
determination of remedy as subject to a balancing test. The more serious the
crime charged, the more serious the violation of rights must be in order for the
tribunal to dismiss the case.
Ultimately, the case law is ambiguous, but it leans in the direction of not
granting remedies when tribunal officials are not involved in defendants' due
process violations. Although the tribunals perhaps ought not to grant full
remedies for all due process violations that take place out of their control, it
would be a mistake to grant only limited remedies in cases of witness
intimidation.

54

Kjel#eli v Prosecutor, Case No ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, T 226 (May 23, 2005) (hereinafter
Kajehijeli,Judgment).

55

Id

56

Id

57

Case No IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest (June 5,
2003) (hereinafter Nikolii, Decision).

225.
320.

58

Id T 2.

59

Id T 15.
Id $T 30-31.

60
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B. US LAW AS A REFERENCE POINT
US law is useful not because the US system is ideal, but rather because the
relevant rights provided in the US Constitution are comparable to those
provided in the tribunals' statutes as discussed in section III. Further, the US
government's division of powers shares some important structural qualities with
the UN and the tribunals.
The key US cases follow directly from Webb, and hold that witness
intimidation by third-party state actors merit the same remedy as intimidation by
judges or prosecutors. In United States v Hammond, a FBI agent threatened a
defense witness testifying in the US District Court for Southern Florida with
charges he was facing in Colorado telling him that if he continued to testify,
there would be 'nothing but trouble' [for him] ... in Colorado.", 61 The witness
reported the threat to the court, and refused to continue to testify. A second
defense witness who heard about the threat also refused to appear in court. The
Fifth Circuit ruled that the agent's action had violated the defendant's right to
62
present witnesses on his behalf and ordered a new trial.
A second case, United States v Thomas, has a similar holding. 63 Here, a Secret

Service agent told a defense witness that if he continued to testify, then he would
be charged with misprision of felony.64 The witness reported the conversation
and refused to continue his testimony.65 The Sixth Circuit reprimanded the
Secret Service agent as well as a US Attorney who had apparently sent the agent
and granted a retrial.66
C. ANALOGY BETWEEN DOMESTIC THIRD PARTIES AND
THIRD-PARTY STATES
If applied directly to the tribunals, the US model suggests that, at the very
least, some significant remedy is appropriate for state-caused process violations
outside the tribunals' control. But of course, the analogy between the tribunals
and the US legal system is limited. Indeed, the executive power the UN wields
over member states is at best a bare shadow of the power the US executive
wields over its agents. But the US government and the UN share a similar legal
structure. Much as the US judiciary relies on state- and federal-controlled police
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forces to make arrests and conduct investigations, the tribunals rely on UN
agents and UN member states to arrest suspects and assist in procurement of
evidence.6 v When a US court issues a subpoena, for example, it relies on the
police to carry it out. The same is generally true for the tribunals, except that
they rely ultimately on the cooperation of UN member states.
Of course, the Security Council's reluctance to intervene and to force
cooperation with the tribunals highlights the primary differences between the US
and the UN system. In reality, UN member states are connected to the tribunals
only very tenuously, while the US courts and police serve under the unifying
power of the US Constitution. Both the US courts and the tribunals rely on
police power vested in other bodies, but the tribunals' inability to directly
influence UN member states necessitates greater, not lesser, remedies for thirdparty process violations.
IV. WHAT REMEDIES SHOULD BE GRANTED FOR

WITNESS INTIMIDATION?
A. THE ARGUMENT FOR FULL REMEDY
First, there is a strong normative argument for full remedy for third-party
witness intimidation.68 This normative argument is recited in the BarayagwiZa I
decision that suggests when the tribunals take responsibility for administering
justice to defendants, only the tribunals can grant remedies for due process
violations.6 9 Because of this, the tribunals have an implicit responsibility to grant
remedies even for violations that take place at the hands of independent states. 0
Justice ought to be relative to the defendants, not the tribunals, and remedies
should reflect this. The US model appears to follow this reasoning, even though
US courts can more readily affect the actions of police agents. In Thomas, for
example, the court granted a retrial
along with a reprimand of the actors
72
involved." The same is true in Webb.
Second, there is an instrumental argument for full remedies based on the
tribunals' inability to impose direct remedies on third-party states. Under a
strong instrumental view, any judicial remedy is intended as much to discourage
67
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actors from treating other defendants unfairly as it is intended to treat a single
defendant fairly. Thus, remedies are granted so that a prosecutor or biased judge
who learns of remedies for other defendants will be discouraged from taking
such actions in the future.
In the US system and among tribunal staff, the discouraging function of
remedies might be carried out by sanctioning the infringing actors. But the
tribunals have little or no power to impose sanctions on UN member states who
infringe on defendants' rights. The Security Council technically has power to
sanction non-cooperating member states, but political and historical realities
suggest this is simply irrelevant. So the discouraging function must be carried
out solely through the remedies themselves. Thus, from an instrumental point of
view, violations outside of the tribunals' control should be met with a full
remedy since this might be the only way to keep states from violating other
defendants' rights.
Indeed, full remedies will probably be effective at curbing interference
from most third-party states, since only states with an interest in seeing a
defendant convicted are likely to intimidate witnesses. If the tribunals ignore or
downplay states' interference, then they provide precisely the wrong incentives.
Without full remedies, a state that interferes with at least a few legitimately
exculpating witnesses would see an overall increase in convictions. A full remedy
would presumably provide the opposite incentives. If remedies assure that
witness intimidation is more likely to derail a conviction than it is to guarantee
one, then states will not have good reason to engage in intimidation. 3
Finally, there is an additional argument for following the US model of
granting full remedies. Because it is easer to intimidate defense witnesses in the
tribunals than in domestic courts, a lesser remedy in the international setting
would presumably lead to more intimidation than is seen in the domestic setting.
At the ICTR, travel to and time spent at the trial chambers in Arusha, Tanzania
can be frightening, burdensome, and time-consuming-especially for the many
witnesses who have never left Rwanda. To a lesser degree, this is true for the
ICTY at the Hague. At both tribunals, a significant number of defense witnesses
are themselves facing domestic charges in connection with genocide or war
crimes, giving governments easy leverage if intimidation is their goal. 4 If the
73
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tribunals want to avoid the appearance of victors' justice, then this presents a
difficult background. The easier it is for states to affect a defendant's ability to
present evidence, the more clearly the tribunals must show that any such action
will result in less punishment for the accused.
B. TRIBUNAL CASE LAW AND FULL REMEDY
The tribunal case law suggests that little regard has been given to these
arguments. While Barayagwiza I explicitly stated that the tribunals should grant
remedy for due process violations that took place elsewhere,7" the decisions that
have followed it have all but overturned this holding. The least cynical reading of
this jurisprudence is that the tribunals (JCTR in particular) want to demonstrate
that they take full responsibility for violations caused by any of their judges or
prosecutors, and, in so doing, take less responsibility for violations caused by
others. This most generous reading, however, reveals a striking logical flaw:
taking less responsibility for states' actions fails to prove the tribunals'
responsibility for their own actions.
A more cynical (and almost certainly more accurate) view recognizes
simply that the tribunals-constantly under pressure to produce convictions and
to do so expeditiously-do not want to take judicial responsibility for state
actions they cannot control. The Nikoli decision demonstrates this attitude most
explicitly by holding that in determining whether the tribunal should exercise
jurisdiction, the ICTY must balance the interest in trying a grave offender of
international law against the severity of the violation committed by a state.7 6
Barayag'i.zaII and SemanZa do not use the "balancing" language, but they appear
to employ similar reasoning. 77 Indeed, the BaraagwiZa decisions demonstrate an
explicit and concerted effort to move away from granting remedies for violations
by UN member states.
At best, this interpretation ignores the positive arguments for granting full
remedy for state-caused process violations. But it appears to have other
weaknesses, as well. First, jurisprudence that relieves states of responsibility for
process violations undermines the role of the tribunals as superior forums for
trying international criminals. This is especially true when the violations are
carried out by the state that might have otherwise tried the defendant-as was
alleged in the recent ICTR cases involving witness intimidation.
This approach also appears to treat due process rights more like
substantive rights. The tribunals so far have only granted compensation
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(monetary or sentence reduction) for failings of due process, electing to allow
prosecutions to continue."8 A better view would recognize these violations as
skewing the trial process itself. To be sure, in Nikoli and Semanza, the process
violations probably did not significantly affect the defendants' ability to present a
defense. But it is fathomable that illegal detention or arrest could affect the
defendants' ability to gather evidence or procure witnesses. At any rate, witness
intimidation has as its primay effect, the degradation of a defendant's case. Thus,
the Barayagwifa and Semanza suggestion that sentence reduction or monetary
compensation can remedy these violations fails to appropriately recognize the
procedural nature of the rights violated.
Finally, the Nikoli balancing test also fails here as a means of determining
when to grant procedural remedies for violations of rights. Under Nikoli,
defendants charged with especially serious crimes will be tried even if there is a
substantial risk that their ability to defend themselves has been compromised.
This violates the right to a presumption of innocence because it allows the
severity of the crime with which a defendant is charged to affect his or her right
to present a defense.
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR APPROPRIATE REMEDY
If the tribunals determine that a full remedy is appropriate, then the next
challenge is to determine an appropriate remedy. As noted above, the tribunals
have most commonly granted sentence reductions or financial compensation for
violations of defendants' process rights. There are reasons, however, why this is
an inappropriate remedy for witness intimidation. The best remedy is a
suspended trial or retrial if witnesses will become available, and dismissal if they
remain unavailable.
Suspension or dismissal solves the normative problems caused by granting
compensation as a remedy for a process right. If a defendant is deprived of a
complete defense, then the trial will stop until the problem is fixed. If the
problem cannot be fixed, then the trial will not continue. In no case will a
defendant's right to present a full defense be exchanged for a shorter sentence
or monetary compensation. This remedy is, of course, severe, and challenges to
the remedy are discussed below. However, in most cases defendants whose cases
are dismissed will be eligible to be tried elsewhere-just not at an international
tribunal.
This remedy also eliminates the normative problems of the Nikoli
balancing test since even defendants accused of the most serious crimes would
be afforded this remedy. To be sure, the tribunals would still have an interest in
78
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making sure defendants accused of very serious crimes are not arbitrarily
released. This could be addressed by expending more effort and time in
obtaining witnesses in especially serious cases.
Assuming for a moment that the tribunals' primary goal in granting a
remedy is deterrence from future interference, we might consider remedies that
affect only the interfering country, not the accused. Under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, such remedies can include fines or sanctions imposed by the UN,
and in the extreme case, forceful intervention. Any proposed fine, though,
would probably have to range in the billions of dollars to even begin to affect
the behavior of state governments, and collection provides a problem of its own.
Sanctions would likewise need to be severe, would certainly be unpopular, and
would likely harm populations that have recently experienced major conflict.
Forceful intervention is by far the most impractical remedy, requiring political
will far beyond what it took to establish the tribunals themselves. In reality,
though, the Security Council has never even chastised non-cooperating states.
These remedies directed solely at interfering states are simply infeasible and
unlikely.
It also seems unlikely that a sentence reduction will have a strong effect on
an interfering nation. If interference with defense witnesses could make
conviction more certain for the price of a shorter sentence, then it would be
unsurprising if interested nations determined that intimidation was in their
interest. To be sure, it is possible that the risk of a short jail sentence for
someone accused of genocide would keep states from intimidating witnesses.
But if the response to the initial release of Barayagwiza is any indicator, states in
reality care more about convictions than sentencing. This certainly seems
intuitive considering the expressive value of a conviction-even if it is followed
by a short sentence.
The preferred remedy is to suspend the trial pending the procurement of
the intimidated witnesses. This remedy provides the right incentives for the
interfering countries and conserves judicial resources. If upon resumption of the
trial the witnesses can be timely obtained, then the chamber may consider only a
minor remedy for this nominal violation of the defendant's rights. Nonetheless,
in the case where the witnesses cannot be obtained, the tribunal should cease to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant and release him or her.79
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Suspension and dismissal provide the right incentives to states because
these remedies will greatly reduce the chance that an interfering nation will
determine it is in its interest to interfere with defense witnesses. In particular, the
threat of dismissal encourages states to produce witnesses quickly if allegations
have been proven. There is even a limited incentive created for states to monitor
intimidating activities carried out by lower ranking officials since the political
fallout of a dismissal could be costly. The remedy is not perfect; states may still
interfere if they think they can do so undetected. And if the interfering state
does not care about convictions, the remedy will have no effect. Security for
witnesses (something that is already in place) can be improved to contravene
problems of detection, though, and states unconcerned about convictions seem
unlikely to interfere very often. Ultimately, suspension and dismissal provides
the only way in which the tribunals can leverage the little power they have over
UN member states to assure cooperation.
D. CHALLENGES TO RETRIAL, SUSPENDED TRIAL, AND
RELEASE AS REMEDIES
Even a retrial or a suspended trial is a controversial remedy. The tribunals
require support from individual nations, who are often concerned with the time
required for and expense incurred by the tribunals. A suspended trial in the
international context is unlikely to be resumed promptly, and retrial is often
quite costly. States particularly concerned with these problems may argue instead
for a kind of "rough justice." These states may support the use of international
criminal courts, but also see the desire for perfect process outweighed by the
cost of that process.
Regardless of whether rough justice is necessary or appropriate in the
international context, cutting costs here will cause disproportionate problems. If
states wish to cut costs, then it might make the most sense to cut costs in a way
that disadvantages prosecutors and defendants equally, for example, by limiting
the case length for both sides. Indeed, states that wish to see faster trials but
want to guard against setting guilty people free might even support limits only to
the process afforded to defendants, disadvantaging them as a group. But cutting
costs in the witness intimidation setting disadvantages only those defendants
with whom states choose to interfere. Indeed, state interference with a
defendant might imply that the defendant is more likely to be innocent in the
first place.

system nearly unmanageable, and its abandonment is a concession to the political reality of the
tribunals' functioning.
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The strongest argument against releasing a defendant for process violations
caused by UN member states is that the tribunals risk losing jurisdiction over a
defendant through no fault of their own. The public reaction to the potential
release of Barayagwiza after BarayagwiZaI illustrates just how costly such a release
is to the tribunals. Recall that the political pressure and the risk of noncooperation from Rwanda were so great after this decision that the ICTR
disregarded one of its own rules in order to reverse its decision and detain
Barayagwiza.8 ° And complaints about the release of a war crimes suspect will
come from all sides. Among the notable critics of Barayagwiza's release was the
traditionally left-leaning Human Rights Watch-although its complaint was
mostly about the ineptitude of the ICTR prosecutors. 81
Part of the outcry about Barayagwiza's release, though, was because of the
exceptional circumstances. Generally, there is no prohibition on trying an
international war criminal in an alternative forum if an international body has
dismissed the case on technical grounds. The Genocide Convention, for
example, specifically provides for genocide suspects to be tried either in an
international forum or in the state where the offense was committed.82 In this
case, though, Barayagwiza was supposed to return to Cameroon, where he was
originally apprehended. At the time, Cameroon had not ratified the Genocide
Convention, and it was not at all clear that it was prepared to extradite
Barayagwiza to Rwanda for trial.83 Thus, there was a possibility that Barayagwiza
would be freed.
In most cases, though, the losses to international justice would only be
marginal. If a tribunal must forfeit jurisdiction, then while the accused may not
stand trial in this preferred international setting, it is likely that the accused can
be tried elsewhere. Indeed, the tribunals appear to have some latitude in
choosing where to release detainees, and this could be used as a tool to maintain
accountability for violators.84 Cases where there is no appropriate or fair
secondary forum available are likely to be few.
These few cases do exist, though, and another strong argument against
release is that it may prompt nations to boycott the tribunals.85 As long as the
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Security Council will not force compliance from UN member states, the
tribunals are at the mercy of states that may choose to cease cooperation with
the tribunals altogether, as Rwanda threatened to do following BarqyagwiZa I.
Freeing a defendant forces the hand of the tribunal, and the aftermath of
BarayagwiZa I suggests that the ICTR was more beholden to Rwandan interests
than it had claimed to be. Had the ICTR not reversed its decision, some argue,
the ICTR may have fallen apart due to lack of Rwandan cooperation-taking
with it some of the international goodwill that has supported the emergence of
international criminal law.86
Nonetheless, the alternative is not necessarily superior. If it becomes clear
that international tribunals are subject to hijacking when a single state dislikes
their outcomes, then the objective of eliminating the stain of victors' justice is
lost. The result will be either that international tribunals (and potentially the
International Criminal Court) will cease to be used, or, perhaps worse, the
international community will bear the costs of sham proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
With allegations of witness intimidation becoming more common at the
ICTR, and with the first arrest warrants being issued at the International
Criminal Court, the problem of third-party state interference with international
criminal proceedings will likely remain. The tribunals have yet to clearly
demonstrate that they are unmoved by state influence. However, they have not
had the urgent necessity to make such a showing. The opportunity is likely to
arise in the coming years and the tribunals' response is certain to influence the
degree to which the world will rely upon and value international criminal justice.
Treating intimidation of defense witnesses as a violation worthy of dismissal will
be a step in the right direction in ensuring that the international community will
respect and value the international criminal justice system.
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